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The Aftermath of HMO Insolvency:
Considerations for Providers
Jay M. Howard*
INTRODUCTION
Membership in health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
reached 45 million subscribers in 1994, with enrollment expected
to exceed 100 million persons by the end of the decade.' The
American Medical Association (AMA) reports that HMO con-
tracts exist in 42% of physicians' practices. The AMA report
also notes that only 35% of these same physicians possessed
HMO contracts in 1988.2 The average revenue from alternative
delivery system contracts held by physicians increased to 32% of
total revenues in 1992, from 23% in 1988.3
President Clinton's health care reform package debated in
1993-94 furthered the perceived importance of managed care,
* Jay Howard is an associate with the Kansas City, Missouri law firm of Shook,
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University of Kansas, his Doctor of Jurisprudence from Washburn University School
of Law, and his Master of Laws in Health Law from Loyola University Chicago,
where he held the LL.M. Fellowship.
The author wishes to extend his gratitude to Dennis R. Dow, who offered substan-
tive comments and editorial guidance in the progression of this article. Mr. Dow is a
shareholder at Shook, Hardy & Bacon, and has practiced, authored, and lectured in
the areas of bankruptcy and business reorganization for 17 years.
The author also wishes to extend his appreciation to his Masters Thesis Advisor,
Professor Lawrence Singer, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, who provided
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1. HMO Membership Hits 45 Million, HEALTH LAW. NEWS REP., Jan. 1994, at 1
[hereinafter HEALTH LAW NEWS].
2. Kurt D. Gillis & David W. Emmons, Physician Involvement With Alternative
Delivery Systems, 1993 SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS MED. PRAC. 15, 15-19.
For the purposes of this study, HMO employees, generally found in staff model
HMOs, are excluded. The authors claim that employed physicians represent only
about 2.4% of the AMA's 1988-1992 Socioeconomic Monitoring Survey respondents.
The represented physicians are those involved in "nonfederal patient care," and in-
clude only those under contract with non-IPA model HMOs. Id.
3. Id. at 16. The definition of alternative delivery system used in the AMA study,
as well as this article, includes such structures as HMOs, preferred provider organiza-
tions (PPOs), and independent physician associations (IPAs). This article addresses
HMOs and IPAs.
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although competitive markets are regarded as the specific driv-
ing force behind the emergence of HMOs. As HMOs rapidly
form and expand, concern has been expressed with regard to the
incidence and impact of HMO insolvencies. Providers in the
current health care market can expect to be affected by an insol-
vency, whether it is of an entity with which the provider con-
tracts or one with which it competes. The concern for HMO
financial insolvency heightens as managed care markets become
increasingly competitive, while a market shift towards providing
care in the outpatient setting has created a surplus capacity for
inpatient services. Financial stability is crucial to surviving in
today's competitive and volatile health care market.
Recent predictions paralleled accountable health plans with
the financial struggle experienced by early formed I-IMOs. 4 The
bankruptcy of either entity adversely impacts participating prov-
iders, creating unanticipated financial risks of an undetermined
amount. It is imperative that providers and their counsel appre-
ciate the consequences of an insolvency or bankruptcy proceed-
ing by an HMO with which providers have a contractual
relationship.
HMO solvency has been generally improving industry wide,
though financial losses are substantial when they do occur. A
survey by the Solvency Working Group of the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) found that providers
are owed an average of $2,005,000 at the time of an HMO
insolvency.6
4. See HEALTH LAW NEWS supra note 1.
5. See Keith E. Boles, Insolvency in Managed Care Organizations: Financial In-
dicators, 19 Topics IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING 2, at 40 (1992) [hereinafter Indica-
tors] (In 1988, 31% of all HMOs were profitable while 50% were reported profitable
in 1989. By 1990, 65% were profitable.); GROUP HEALTH Ass'N OF Am., HMO IN-
DUSTRY PROFILE 57 (1993) (The Group Health Association of America (GHAA), a
national trade group representing HMOs, reported that 83% of the HMO industry
experienced positive gross income in 1991. For a summary of the HMO industry fi-
nancial performance, see chapter V, Financial Performance) (on file with author);
Paul Kenkel, Financial Health Gives HMOs Hope in Reform Discussions, MODERN
HEALTH CARE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 33 (results of a smaller survey of 45 HMOs showed
that 91% of the HMOs anticipated finishing 1992 in the black); SUSAN PALSBO,
GROUP HEALTH Ass'N OF AM., HMO MARKET POSITION REPORT 2 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter MARKET] (The GHAA reported that an estimated 89% of HMOs expected a sur-
plus in 1993.) (on file with the author).
6. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 1989-1 NAIC Proc. 344, at 362 [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS]. The survey conducted encompassed 35 states and 595 HMOs, or 92%
of the country's HMO industry. Id. at 344. See also, Indicators, supra note 5, at 40
(Total HMO losses were reported at $311 million and $851 million in 1986 and 1987,
[Vol. 4
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The Solvency Working Group survey further reports that only
21% of the states responding to the survey were confident that
they were authorized to govern HMO rehabilitation or conser-
vation activities.7 Clearly, the need for regulation of HMO sol-
vency, and control of the insolvency process, is greater than
ever. This article addresses HMO fiscal soundness statutes, reg-
ulations, standards, and model act provisions that constitute the
legal playing field governing HMO solvency. Reference will be
made to the different levels of risk incurred by a provider when
an HMO proceeds with liquidation under a state insurance pro-
cedure as well as the risks experienced when an HMO seeks
liquidation or reorganization under federal bankruptcy laws.
This article will also review cases that resolve the conflict be-
tween HMOs seeking relief under the Federal Bankruptcy Code
and insurance commissioners advocating the resolution of HMO
insolvencies pursuant to their state insurance procedures. 8
I. AN OVERVIEW OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATIONS
To appreciate the impact of an HMO insolvency on providers,
it is important to understand the different types of HMOs and
the ways in which they structure their provider relationships.
The definition of an HMO has been forced to evolve as quickly
as the number of emerging applications. Traditionally, an HMO
was defined as an entity that financed and delivered complete
health care services to enrollees for a prepaid fee per enrollee.
No longer, however, can an HMO be defined by prepaid financ-
ing.9 A contemporary definition acknowledges that an HMO is
also a health plan that possesses primary care physicians as gate-
keepers and shifts varying degrees of financial risk for medical
respectively, while in 1988 reported losses equaled $821 million. In 1989, there were
at least 800,000 enrollees in bankrupt or closed HMOs in California alone.). See also
Cynthia Mines, Local HMOs Dipping Further into Red, WICHITA Bus. J., Apr. 16,
1993, at 1 (of four HMOs serving the Wichita and surrounding areas in Kansas, three
reported net losses for 1992).
7. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 347.
8. Obviously, numerous parties may incur losses when an HMO is insolvent, in-
cluding enrollees, hospital providers, employers, state regulators and citizens, other
HMOs, creditors, and interest groups. This article is narrowly aimed at the specific
impact of such failures on providers, and will accordingly address only issues arising in
this context.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1988). Section 300e provides a detailed definition of an
HMO, including organizational requirements and the "manner of supplying basic and
supplemental health services to members." Id. § 300e(b). See also 42 C.F.R. § 417
(1995) (regulatory definition of an HMO).
19951
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expenses to providers. 10 Subscribers who enroll in an HMO are
generally restricted to utilizing the participating providers in or-
der to receive full plan coverage.
An HMO might feature any one of, or a hybrid of, four broad
structures distinguished by the differing relationships between
the entity and the medical care providers. A "staff model"
HMO directly employs physicians to provide medical care at the
organization's facilities and exclusively to the organization's en-
rollees. Generally, HMO staff physicians are salaried employ-
ees. According to a Group Health Association of America
(GHAA) survey, staff model HMOs represented 11% of all
plans and 14% of all enrollees by the end of 1992.11
The second structure, a "group model" HMO, is an HMO
that contracts with an independent multispecialty physician
membership to render care to enrollees without limiting the
physician's service to enrollees. 12 Payment to the contracted
physicians is generally set through a "capitated" basis, not de-
pendent upon enrollee utilization. The GHAA reports that by
the end of 1992, group model HMOs represented 10% of HMO
plans and 24% of all enrollees. 3
In contrast to the group model, a "network" HMO contracts
with several groups as well as individual physicians to furnish
medical services for HMO enrollees in the physician's office.
Again, there is no limitation on the physician's ability to service
nonmember patients. A physician may contract with as many
HMOs as feasible. Network HMOs constituted 16% of HMO
plans and 16% of all enrollees by the end of 1992, according to
the GHAA survey.14
A similar lack of restrictions upon the allowable patient base
is standard in the contractual relationship between an HMO and
an "independent practice association" (IPA). 15 The IPA entity is
a voluntary formation consisting of individual physicians or
groups. The open nature of the IPA-allowing any physicians
10. Peter R. Kongstvedt, Glossary of Terms, Jargon, and Common Acronyms, in
THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 504 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed.
1993) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
11. GROUP HEALTH ASS'N OF AM., 1993 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF HMOs 23
[hereinafter DIRECTORY].
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(4) (1988) (defining "medical group"); 42 C.F.R. § 417.1
(1995) (defining "medical group").
13. DIRECTORY, supra note 11, at 23.
14. Id. at 23, 176-80, 220-28.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(5) (1988) (defining "individual practice association");
42 C.F.R. § 417.1 (1995) (defining "individual practice association").
[Vol. 4
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who meet the selection criteria to join-explains the common
reference to this form as an "open panel." The providers con-
tract with the IPA entity to provide care in their offices in ex-
change for payments on either a fee-for-service or capitated
basis. In addition, an IPA can subcapitate to physicians outside
of the IPA or to another IPA. Endless variations, or "mixed-
model" HMOs, exist in the market.
In an IPA setting, the HMO often contracts as a management
organization, usually providing a capitated payment to the IPA
in order to meet state statutory requirements.16 As in the other
forms, the HMO contracting with an IPA continues to function
as the marketing director. The IPA physicians are generally al-
lowed to continue to see an unlimited number of nonenrollees.
The IPA model HMO constituted 63% of HMO plans by the
end of 1992 and covered 46% of all enrollees. 7 Various aspects
of these four general HMO structures are often shared within a
single HMO.18
Conceptually, different forms of HMO delivery systems are
unified by the way in which they place financial risk. Traditional
third-party indemnity insurance involves a risk-accepting insurer
who receives a prepaid premium. 19 In exchange, the insurer re-
imburses a determined amount and type of medical care. In
contrast, an HMO provides or arranges for care while shifting
degrees of risk for financial loss to the medical care providers.
Risk-transferring techniques may include established cost con-
tainment incentives, utilization controls, and organized compen-
sation arrangements.2° In a staff model HMO, risk transference
may take the form of incentive arrangements or bonuses to phy-
sicians based on their performance. 2' Nevertheless, traditional
16. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN . § 40-3202(f)(2) (1993) (requiring "predetermined
periodic rate basis" except for copay amounts); Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.400(6) (1991)
(defining an HMO in terms of providing services on a prepaid basis).
17. DIRECTORY, supra note 11, at 23. See also id. at 176-80, 220-28.
18. Id. The GHAA reports that 16% of all HMOs were mixed models in 1992,
with the IPA form representing the least mixed. Shared variations were observed in
almost one-half of all staff model HMOs.
19. See GEORGE J. COUCH, 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:3 (rev. ed. 1984) ("The
primary requisite essential to a contract of insurance is the assumption of risk of loss
and the undertaking to indemnify the insured against such loss.").
20. John F. Monahan & Michael Willis, Special Legal Status for HMOs: Cost Con-
tainment Catalyst or Marketplace Impediment?, 18 STETSON L. REV. 353, 355 (1989).
The topic of risk transference to providers in the HMO setting is beyond the scope of
this article, and is amply covered in works dedicated solely to the concept.
21. See Peter R. Kongstvedt, Compensation of Primary Care Physicians in Open
Panels, in HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 58. A popular compensation arrangement to
1995]
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legal differences between indemnity insurance and HMOs have
blurred as quickly evolving alternative delivery systems become
more complex.
An illustration of the gray area between an insurance "prod-
uct" and an HMO is found in the increasingly popular form of
HMO offering known as a "point-of-service" (POS) option.22
Under a POS, an enrollee may seek care from a non-HMO phy-
sician and the HMO will reimburse that care, although typically
a fairly substantial copay (and/or deductible) will be required.
Conversely, no payment might be necessary if the enrollee seeks
care from an HMO physician. Further blurring the separation,
insurance plans now include utilization management tracking
procedures that were previously only found in HMOs.23
The "dual-quality" aspect of certain contemporary HMOs and
insurance products, both reimbursing and arranging for care,
creates a difficult situation for courts and insurance commission-
ers confronted with an HMO facing bankruptcy. Should an in-
solvent HMO be allowed to be a debtor and liquidate or
reorganize pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, or is an HMO an
insurance company which proceeds towards liquidation under
the regulation of a state insurance commissioner? The proce-
dures, as well as the potential success of creditors seeking pay-
ment, differ under each scheme. This uncertainty is particularly
unsettling to health care providers who contract with an HMO
that ultimately becomes insolvent, as well as to providers'
counsel.24
transfer risk may take the form of a "withhold arrangement," which allows the HMO
to retain a percentage of the capitation pool to compensate for costs exceeding those
allotted for institutional or referral services.
22. See MARKET, supra note 5, at 2. At that time, the GHAA anticipated that
83% of HMOs would offer a point-of-service option in 1994.
23. Eric R. Wagner, Types of Managed Care Organizations, in HANDBOOK, supra
note 10, at 12-16.
24. See Colette B. Resnik, Maxicare as a Guide for Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMOs) in Bankruptcy, 8 BANKR. DEVS. J. 271, 273 (1991). Medical services
are rendered to HMO members through both "contract" and "noncontract" provid-
ers. Contract providers agree to deliver care based on a capitated or other agreed-
upon payment structure. Noncontract providers render care when contract providers
are unavailable or unable to deliver services. A noncontract provider is often utilized
for emergency care or specialty services and is paid on a reduced fee-for-service
schedule. Id. at 273-74. Both types of providers face losses should the HMO become
insolvent. However, the provider receiving capitated payments may be better off than
the provider operating on a fee-for-service basis. It is not uncommon for an HMO to
fall several months behind in its fee-for-service payments, which, of course, cover
services already provided. In the capitation system, the provider receives pre-set, reg-
[Vol. 4
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II. FEDERAL HMO LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS
HMOs received federal guidance and legitimacy with the con-
gressional enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization
Act of 1973 (HMO Act), pursuant to which plans can volunta-
rily become "federally qualified. '25 Although certainly not all
HMOs are so qualified, obtaining federal qualification offers
certain advantages. 26 The HMO Act initially offered numerous
grants, loans, and other financial development benefits for qual-
ified HMOs as well as establishing organizational, operating,
and continuing regulatory requirements. 27 Additional advan-
tages accompanying federal qualification exist: a dual-choice
mandate, scheduled to end in 1995, requiring specified employ-
ers to offer an HMO if a federally qualified organization ap-
proaches the employer, a perceived stability for employers who
may view qualification as a federal stamp of approval; a reduced
time period for Medicare risk contracting; and exemptions from
excessively restrictive state laws.28
These advantages come at the price of additional regulations,
particularly in the area of solvency. For example, the federal
HIMO Act's organizational requirements compel an HMO to
possess "(1) a fiscally sound operation, and (2) adequate provi-
sion against the risk of insolvency .... -29 The organization must
assume the entire financial risk for the provision of medical care
on a prospective basis, subject to the ability to obtain insurance
in prescribed circumstances. 30 An HMO, however, is allowed to
arrange to shift or share the prospective financial risk through
provisions with participating individuals or institutions. 31 Nev-
ertheless, the HMO must continue to protect its enrollees. The
HMO Act prohibits enrollees from "incurring liability for pay-
ment of any fees which are the legal obligation" of the HMO.
32
ular payments; if the HMO falls behind in its payments, the provider may have a
warning of financial instability.
25. Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 931 (1973) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1982)).
See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(d) (1988) (defining "qualified health maintenance organiza-
tion"); see also Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, S. REP. No. 129, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3033, 3039-40 (providing the
justification for enactment).
26. Health Maintenance Organizations, in ASPEN HEALTH LAW CTR., MANAGED
CARE LAW MANUAL § 3-2, at 7 (1994).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(1)(i), (ii) (1988).
30. Id. § 300e(c)(2) (1988).
31. Id. § 300e(c)(2)(D).
32. Id. § 300e(c)(7) (1988). Allowable forms of protection include:
1995]
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Annual information regarding the fiscal soundness of the quali-
fied HMO must be made available to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services.33 Significantly, however, the federal law
provides no guidance as to the procedures governing a plan that
becomes insolvent.
HMOs seeking to achieve qualified status under the HMO
Act must additionally comply with regulations promulgated by
the Health Care Financing Administration. 34 The regulatory re-
quirements include those relating to insolvency protection. The
fiscal soundness of the HMO must be proved to the Secretary by
generally demonstrating that assets are greater than liabilities
and that a net operating surplus exists.35 Of importance to prov-
iders, a federally qualified HMO must possess a plan that con-
tinues benefits to enrollees in the event the plan becomes
insolvent.36 Further, the regulations require the HMO to take
steps to assure that members are not held liable for any fees that
are the HMO's legal obligation.37 However, the regulations also
provide no guidance as to the procedures to be followed in the
event of an insolvency of an HMO.
(A) a contractual arrangement with any hospital that is regularly used by
the members of such organization prohibiting such hospital from holding
any such member liable for payment of any fees which are the legal obliga-
tion of such organization;
(B) insolvency insurance, acceptable to the Secretary;
(C) adequate financial reserve, acceptable to the Secretary; and
(D) other arrangements, acceptable to the Secretary, to protect members,
except that the requirements of this paragraph shall not apply to a health
maintenance organization with protection from liability for payment of any
fees which are the legal obligation of such organization ....
Id.
33. Id. § 300e-17 (1988).
34. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.1 (1995). Although the argument has been made by coun-
sel in HMO insolvency cases, as will be seen in the remaining discussion, the mere fact
that an HMO is governed in part by federal regulations does not conclusively indicate
that federal bankruptcy protocol prevails in the event of an insolvency. See Selcke v.
Medcare HMO, 147 B.R. 895, 902 (N.D. Il. 1992), aff'd sub nom. In re Estate of
Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1993).
35. 42 C.F.R. § 417.120(a) (1995) (The regulation requires each HMO to: "(1)
[H]ave a fiscally sound operation, as demonstrated by the following: (i) Total assets
being greater than total unsubordinated liabilities[;] (ii) Sufficient cash flow and ade-
quate liquidity to meet obligations as they become due[; and] (iii) A net operating
surplus, or a financial plan [pursuant to the next paragraph].").
36. Id. §§ 417.120(a)(iv), 417.122(b) (1995) (an HMO must have a plan for han-
dling insolvency that allows for continuation of benefits for the duration of the con-
tract period for which payment has been made and continuation of benefits to
members who are confined on the date of insolvency in an inpatient facility until their
discharge).
37. Id. § 417.122(a) (1995).
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An important section of the HMO Act addresses the situation
that arises when state laws are found to be more restrictive than
the federal structure. It provides that an HMO that is prohib-
ited from operating as an HMO by a state law will not be pre-
vented from operating in accordance with the HMO Act. One
of the preempted state law restrictions is any requirement that
an HMO meet insurance company standards regarding "initial
capitalization and establishment of financial reserves against in-
solvency. ' 38 Thus, regulation by the federal government over
federally qualified HMOs conflicts with the regulation of insur-
ers, which is nearly the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.39
III. STATE HIMO LEGISLATION AND THE MODEL IMO ACT
Comprehensive HMO legislation has been enacted in forty-
seven states, while the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Oregon,
and Wisconsin regulate HMOs according to other laws, includ-
ing those governing insurance companies. 40 The majority of
state legislation is based on a Model HMO Act developed by
the NAIC, though many variations exist in the actual implemen-
tation of the Model Act.4'
The Model HMO Act contains expansive regulations and re-
quirements for receiving a certificate of operation. Section 13 of
the Model Act contains a formula to calculate suggested initial
and minimum net worth requirements. In addition, a deposit of
at least $300,000 is required in order to protect the HMO en-
rollees and assure continued services if the organization is in re-
habilitation or conservation.42
A "hold-harmless" clause must be included in all provider
contracts to protect a subscriber or enrollee from liability for
38. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a)(1)(D) (1988).
39. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 347; see also Selcke v. Medcare HMO, 147
B.R. 895 (N.D. IU. 1992), aff'd sub nor. In re Estate of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d 436
(7th Cir. 1993). The HMO argued that the state liquidation scheme was preempted
by the federal HMO Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10. The district court stated
that this provision does not provide an alternate liquidation scheme because it refers
to initial capitalization amounts. Further, the court noted that state provisions not
expressly conflicting with the federal HMO Act are generally not preempted. Id. at
907 n.7 (citing Health Care Plan of N.J. v. Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 440, 446 (D.N.J.
1982), aff'd mem., 707 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983)).
40. See HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 7.
41. Id. at 8.
42. See HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT § 13(B)(5), 2 Model Reg.
Serv. (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (1990) [hereinafter MODEL HMO ACT].
19951
9
Howard: Aftermath of HMO Insolvency: Considerations for Providers, The
Published by LAW eCommons, 1995
Annals of Health Law
HMO debts. 3 The HMO must also maintain a plan to ensure
that services will not be interrupted in the event of an insol-
vency. Approved methods for achieving this goal include insur-
ance, insolvency reserves, letters of credit, and other acceptable
arrangements." An approved plan also mandates provisions in
provider contracts that require the continuation of the pro-
vider's services for which payment has been made, despite an
HMO's insolvency. It is also suggested that providers be re-
quired to give 60 days notice prior to terminating an
agreement.45
An additional insolvency deposit is required when uncovered
expenditures, which are HMO costs for health care services for
which an enrollee could be liable in the event of an insolvency,
exceed a specified amount.46 For example, if uncovered expend-
itures exceed ten percent of total health care expenditures at
any time, the deposit is required.4 7 Further, in the event of in-
solvency, the state insurance commissioner, in order to grant
43. Id. § 13(D). See also M.E. Overlock, Managed Care and the Infamous Hold
Harmless Clause, J. TENN. MED. ASS'N, Oct. 1993, at 453, 453-56. Overlock notes that
the "hold-harmless" clause "may form the backbone of state and national health care
reform since health insurers can effectively use them to pass off financial and liability
risks to physicians." He notes that hold-harmless clauses generally come in two
forms, while a third type of clause is often incorrectly labeled. The first form of a
hold-harmless clause is observed in a physician's agreement in an HMO contract not
to bill an enrollee for fees beyond those allowed by the HMO, or in the event the
HMO does not or is unable to pay the doctor. A second type contains the physician's
covenant not to request a "contribution" from an HMO to assist with the payment of
a damages claim. The third type, which the author argues should not be categorized
as a hold-harmless clause, mandates the physician to "indemnify" the HMO by com-
pensating the entity for any damages and legal fees for which it may be held accounta-
ble in a court decision. Id. at 453.
44. MODEL HMO Acr, supra note 42, § 13(E)(1), (3)-(5).
45. Id. § 13(F).
46. Id. § 2. "Uncovered expenditures" are
the costs to the health maintenance organization for health care services that
are the obligation of the health maintenance organization, for which an en-
rollee may also be liable in the event of the health maintenance organiza-
tion's insolvency and for which no alternative arrangements have been made
that are acceptable to the commissioner [director, superintendent].
Id. The Comment to this Model Act provision states that the definition is for use in
section 13. The defined expenditures
will vary in type and amount, depending upon the arrangements of the
HMO. They may include out-of-area services, referral services and hospital
service. They do not include expenditures for services when a provider has
agreed not to bill the enrollee even though the provider is not paid by the
HMO, or for services that are guaranteed, insured or assumed by a person or
organization other than the health maintenance organization.
Id.
47. Id. § 14. The provision requires in subsection (A) that
[Vol. 4
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sufficient protection and time to provide replacement coverage
for enrollees, may require other HMOs to hold a period for
nonmember enrollment. 48
The Model Act section governing the regulation of an insol-
vent HMO states that "[a]ny rehabilitation, liquidation, or con-
servation of a health maintenance organization shall be deemed
to be the rehabilitation, liquidation, or conservation of an insur-
ance company and shall be conducted under the supervision of
the commissioner ... pursuant to the law governing the rehabili-
tation, liquidation or conservation of insurance companies. '49
This provision essentially labels the HMO a "domestic insurer"
for these purposes, thereby specifically preventing the HMO
from seeking the protection of the Bankruptcy Code.
Thus, the priority of claims is determined by the law that the
state has adopted to govern the liquidation of its insurers. The
HMO members will have the same priority in a distribution of
general assets as would be granted to the holders of an insur-
ance policy in an insurer liquidation.50 In general, the policy-
holders of an insurance company subject to an order of
liquidation are of equal status with general unsecured creditors,
sharing pro rata in the insurance company's assets.'
If an HMO member is liable to a provider for care rendered
under the plan, the liability is shifted to "the status of an en-
rollee claim for distribution of the general assets. ' 52 Providers
subject to a hold-harmless clause are allowed priority after that
of enrollees and enrollees' beneficiaries "and immediately pre-
ceding the priority of distribution described in [the insurance
code of the state]." 53 In other words, the HMO member is
granted priority over the provider's claim as a creditor, and the
[i]f at any time uncovered expenditures exceed ten percent (10%) of total
health care expenditures, a health maintenance organization shall place an
uncovered expenditures insolvency deposit with the commissioner [director,
superintendent], with any organization or trustee acceptable to the commis-
sioner [director, superintendent] through which a custodial or controlled ac-
count is maintained, cash or securities that are acceptable to the
commissioner. Such deposit shall at all times have a fair market value in an
amount of 120% of the HMO's outstanding liability for uncovered expendi-
tures for enrollees in this state ....
48. Id. §§ 14-15.
49. Id. § 21(A).
50. Id.
51. JOHN A. "APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrCE
§ 10721 (1982).
52. MODEL HMO Acr, supra note 42, § 21(B).
53. Id.
19951
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provider subject to a hold-harmless clause receives priority over
other creditors' claims.
The following section analyzes these issues using the States of
Kansas and Missouri as case studies.
A. Case Study One: Kansas
Kansas requires an HMO to apply to the Commissioner of
Insurance for a certificate of authority before operating in the
state. 4 The application process requires numerous disclosures,
including several disclosures specifically related to fiscal sound-
ness and projections.5
HMOs are specifically excluded from the definition of "mem-
ber insurers" under the Kansas Life and Health Insurance Guar-
anty Association Act.56 The Guaranty Act would provide
certain life, health, or annuity coverage in the event that a
"member insurer" is impaired or becomes insolvent.57
The Kansas legislation specifies the powers of an HMO and
places certain restrictions on the organization's contracts.58 For
example, a hold-harmless clause is required for the protection of
54. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3203 (1993).
55. Id. § 40-3203(6)(A)-(C)(iv). The provision specifically requires:
(A) descriptions of financing arrangements for operational deficits and for
developmental costs if operational one year or less;
(B) a copy of the most recent unaudited financial statements of the health
maintenance organization;
(C) financial projections using an accrual accounting system with generally
accepted accounting principles for a minimum of three years from the antici-
pated date of certification and on a monthly basis from the date of certifica-
tion through one year. If the health maintenance organization is expected to
incur a deficit, projections shall be made for each deficit year and for one
year thereafter. Financial projections shall include:
(i) monthly statements of revenue and expense for the first year on a
gross dollar as well as per-member-per-month basis, with quarters consistent
with standard calendar year quarters;
(ii) quarterly statements of revenue and expense for each subsequent
year;
(iii) a quarterly balance sheet; and
(iv) statement and justification of assumptions.
The commissioner is vested with the power to deny, suspend, or revoke a health
maintenance organization's certificate of authority and administer penalties. Upon
revoking the certificate, the commissioner may inform the Attorney General, whose
"duty" it becomes to "commence and prosecute an action in the proper court to dis-
solve such [HMO] ... ." Id. § 40-3205 (1993).
56. Id. § 40-3005(h)(2).
57. See id. § 40-3002 (1993) (describing the purpose of an insurance guaranty
fund); § 40-3003 (1993) (describing covered persons); § 40-3005(f) (defining impaired
insurer); § 40-3005(g) (defining insurer).
58. See id. §§ 40-3208, 40-3209 (1993).
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enrollees. 59 Further, the Commissioner has the power to ex-
amine Kansas HMOs and certain providers as necessary to pro-
tect the interests of Kansas citizens. 60  Because no other
provisions exist, protection for members enrolled in insolvent
HMOs in Kansas is principally established through the deposit
and insurance requirements.
No specific provision is made in the Kansas HMO Act, or in
implementing regulations, for procedures to govern the adminis-
tration of proceedings for an insolvent Kansas HMO. Kansas
has not adopted the Model HMO Act provision that requires
insolvency to be governed pursuant to state insurance proceed-
ings, nor have any other laws been adopted to prescribe the pro-
cedure to regulate an insolvent HMO in Kansas. Accordingly,
health care providers that contract with a Kansas HMO have no
certainty as to the priority of their claims in the event of insol-
vency of the HMO.
B. Case Study Two: Missouri
Missouri provides an interesting comparison with Kansas, es-
pecially in light of the fact that the two states border each other,
and that Missouri allows some degree of reciprocity: HMOs es-
tablished and regulated in states bordering Missouri, such as
Kansas, are admitted to Missouri if they satisfy established
criteria.6'
59. See id. § 40-3209(b). An HMO is prevented from contracting with a provider
if the contract
require[s] enrollees to guarantee payment, other than copayments and de-
ductibles, to such provider in the event of nonpayment by the [HMO] for
any services which have been performed under contracts between such en-
rolees and the [HMO]. Further, any contract between a [HMO] and a pro'
vider shall provide that if the [HMO] fails to pay for covered health care
services as set forth in the contract between the [HMO] and its enrollee, the
enrollee or covered dependents shall not be liable to any provider for any
amounts owed by the [HMO]. If there is no written contract between the
[HMO] and the provider or if the written contract fails to include the above
provision, the enrollee and dependents may not be liable to any provider for
any amounts owed by the [HMO].
Id.
60. Id. § 40-3211 (1993). In addition, an HMO operating in Kansas is also re-
quired to establish calculated deposit requirements, subject to certain exceptions, in
order to compensate for uncovered expenditures. Id. § 40-3227 (1993).
61. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.540 (1991). The law establishes that
[a] health maintenance organization approved and regulated under the laws
of another bordering state may be admitted to do business in this state by
satisfying the director that it is fully and legally organized under the laws of
its state, and that it complies with all requirements for health maintenance
1995]
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A person seeking to operate an HMO in Missouri must first
obtain a certificate of authority from the Director of the Divi-
sion of Insurance of the Department of Economic Develop-
ment.62 Insurance companies licensed in Missouri are allowed
to operate an HMO subject to certain restrictions.63 An HMO
must file financial statements. 64 The Director must consider the
HMO's financial stability and adequacy of its working capital,
and the HMO must meet deposit requirements subject to cer-
tain exceptions. 65 HMOs must submit annual reports to the Di-
rector regarding the financial position of the organization.66 The
Director is also granted the authority to examine the affairs of
an HMO.67
Similar to Kansas, Missouri HMOs are specifically excluded
from the Missouri Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associa-
tion Act.68 The Missouri HMO Act provides that unless specifi-
cally stated otherwise, the laws applicable to Missouri insurance
companies are not applicable to HMOs. 69
The Act establishes a priority in HMO liquidation proceed-
ings for providers' claims for an "uncovered expenditure" over
the claims of other providers.70 This priority applies to those
organizations organized within Missouri. The director may waive or modify
the provisions of sections 354.400 to 354.550 [the HMO Act] if he deter-
mines that the same are not appropriate or necessary to a particular health
maintenance organization of another state.
62. Id. § 354.405 (1991).
63. Id. § 354.475 (1991).
64. Id. § 354.405.3(7) (1991). HMOs must submit to the director
[f]inancial statements showing the applicant's assets, liabilities, and sources
of financial support. If the applicant's financial affairs are audited by in-
dependent certified public accountants, a copy of the applicant's most recent
certified financial statement shall be deemed to satisfy this requirement un-
less the director directs that additional or more recent financial information
is required for the proper administration [of this act].
Id.
65. Id. §§ 354.410.3-354.410.5, 354.455 (1991) (required deposit and form);
§ 354.410.2 (1991) (formula to determine the deposit amount).
66. Id. § 354.435 (1991).
67. Id. § 354.465 (1991).
68. Id. § 376.718(9) (1991).
69. Id. § 354.505.1 (1991).
70. Id. § 354.480 (1991). The definition of an "uncovered expenditure" includes
the costs of health care services that are covered by a health maintenance
organization, but that are not guaranteed, insured, or assumed by a person
or organization other than the health maintenance organization, or those
costs which a provider has not agreed to forgive enrollees if the provider is
not paid by the health maintenance organization.
Id, § 354.400(12) (1991).
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providers who have entered into HMO agreements with hold-
harmless provisions.71 Missouri has adopted the Model HMO
Act provision asserting state insurance jurisdiction over the liq-
uidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of HMOs.72 Conse-
quently, in Missouri, regulation of an insolvent HMO is to be
conducted pursuant to the state laws governing an insurance
company insolvency.73
The procedures governing the distribution of assets belonging
to a Missouri insurance company in liquidation are established
by state law. Priority is established for the expenses of closing
the business and disposing of the assets, taxes, debts to the
United States and municipalities, and policy claims. Thereafter,
other debts, claims, and unearned premiums are paid.74 In this
scheme, the claims of HMO members are analogous to those of
policyholders, who receive a priority over the claims of health
care providers, who, as creditors, are paid later.
71. Id. § 354.480.2 (1991).
72. Id. § 354.480.
73. Id. § 354.480.1 (1991).
Any rehabilitation, liquidation, or conservation of a health maintenance or-
ganization shall be deemed to be the rehabilitation, liquidation or conserva-
tion of an insurance company and shall be conducted under the supervision
of the director pursuant to the laws governing the rehabilitation, liquidation,
or conservation of an insurance company. The director may apply for an
order directing him to rehabilitate, liquidate, or conserve a health mainte-
nance organization upon any one or more grounds set out in section 354.355,
or section 375.560, R.S.Mo., or when, in his opinion, the continued operation
of the health maintenance organization would be hazardous either to the
enrollees or to the people of this state. Enrollees shall have the same prior-
ity in the event of liquidation or rehabilitation granted the policyholders of
an insurer.
Id. See also id. § 375.560 (1991) (describing when director may initiate wind-up
procedures).
74. Id. § 375.700 (Supp. 1995).
Unless reinsurance of a dissolved insurer is effected and its assets conveyed
to the reinsuring company as provided by law, and unless such insurer is
being rehabilitated under other provisions.. . , the receiver, under the direc-
tion of the court, shall apply the sums realized from the assets of such insurer
in hereinafter making any partial or final distribution, in the following order:
(1) To payment of all the expenses of closing the business and disposing
of the assets of such insurer;
(2) To the payment of all lawful taxes and debts due the state and the
United States and the counties and municipalities of this state;
(3) To the payment of policy claims;
(4) To the payment of the other debts and claims allowed against such
insurer, and the unearned premiums and the surrendered value of its poli-
cies, in proportion to their respective amounts.
15
Howard: Aftermath of HMO Insolvency: Considerations for Providers, The
Published by LAW eCommons, 1995
Annals of Health Law
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY
CODE TO HiMOs
If an HMO is determined to qualify as a "debtor" under the
Bankruptcy Code, it may choose to file a Chapter 11 petition in
order to facilitate a reorganization.7 5 Holders of claims against
the debtor HMO will have different rights based on when those
claims arose. The Chapter 11 petition creates a stay, which pro-
vides immediate protection for the debtor against prepetition
claims. Those claims will be paid pursuant to the terms of a plan
of reorganization if one is confirmed. Postpetition claims, how-
ever, are to be paid in due course.76 A provider may have claims
arising in both categories.
If the debtor can generate sufficient income to pay creditors
over a reasonable period of time, and the liquidation value of its
assets is low, a Chapter 11 filing will best serve the interests of
the HMO and its creditors. The plan confirmation process is
designed to ensure that creditors receive at least as much as they
would if the debtor was liquidated.77
Alternatively, a debtor HMO unable to effectively reorganize
may proceed to liquidate pursuant to Chapter 7. Generally, a
trustee is appointed and charged with liquidating the debtor's
assets in a way that realizes the highest value for the creditors.
Chapter 7 liquidation is generally selected when maintaining the
debtor as a going concern will produce lower returns than the
liquidation of the organization.
The filing of a case under Chapter 11 creates an "estate,"
which consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case. ' 78 The automatic
stay (mentioned above) is an important Code provision, which
directly affects providers in relationships with an HMO seeking
reorganization. 79 As soon as the Chapter 11 petition is filed and
a case commences, this injunction effectively protects the debtor
75. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988). See generally James C. Dechene, Bankruptcy Proceed-
ings Affecting Healthcare, in 3 NAT'L HEALTH LAWYERS Ass'N, HEALTH LAW PRAC-
TICE GUIDE ch. 30 (Alice G. Gosfield et al. eds., 1993) (overview of bankruptcy)
[hereinafter GUIDE].
76. It is noted that although postpetition claims are paid in due course, in most
situations funds are not available for full satisfaction of such claims.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
78. See GUIDE, supra note 75, § 30.04, at 30-11 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. 1993). The automatic stay prevents:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
[Vol. 4
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and the property of the estate from a provider who brings an
action to recover claims against the debtor. Further, the stay
has been extended in at least one case to prevent noncontract
providers from asserting claims against HMO member pa-
tients.80 Contract providers relinquish this power.
A second important issue for providers dealing with an HMO
seeking federal bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 is the
characterization of the relationship. Pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Code, a debtor is given the right to reject or assume any execu-
tory contract.81 Generally, executory contracts include contracts
"under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material
breach excusing the performance of the other."82 An HMO pro-
vider contract generally imposes a continuing obligation upon
the HMO to reimburse the provider for services, and a continu-
ing obligation upon the provider to continue services to the en-
rollees. (A provider may also have an ethical obligation to
continue to provide services through the physician-patient rela-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of
a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and (8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Id. § 362(a)(1)-(8).
80. GUIDE, supra note 75, § 30-14[1], at 30-14 (citing In re Family Health Servs.,
Inc., 105 B.R. 937 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989)). The court took this action based on
sections 105 and 362(a)(1) of the Code and an analogy to case law extending the
automatic stay to nondebtor parties based on an identity of interests test. The court
cited a case in which the automatic stay was extended to a third party indemnified by
the debtor because an action against the third party would simply result in a claim
against the debtor. Thus, the parties' identity of interests supported the extension of
the automatic stay to the third party. Id. at 942-43.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
82. GUIDE, supra note 75, § 30.04[2], at 30-15 (citing Ven Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973)).
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tionship.) An HMO provider contract generally satisfies the
definition of an executory contract.
If the debtor HMO elects to assume the executory contract,
the debtor is required to cure or provide assurances that it will
promptly cure any defaults occurring before the petition filing.83
If the debtor HMO owes the provider past payments, those ac-
counts are required to be settled at assumption, or a plan must
be provided to ensure that such payments are made.81 The
amounts must be paid in full, and it is thus in the best interests
of the provider to have the contract assumed as early as
possible.
Rejecting executory contracts is generally characterized as a
material breach of the contract by the debtor. Such a breach
would give a provider a damage claim. The breach is deemed
one that occurred prior to the filing of the petition,85 and thus is
treated as a nonpriority unsecured claim to be paid according to
the terms of the reorganization plan approved by the bank-
ruptcy court.86
Perhaps most important to a health care provider, the Bank-
ruptcy Code prohibits a provider from terminating a provider
agreement with an HMO that becomes insolvent or seeks bank-
ruptcy protection, notwithstanding the fact that a provider may
have bargained for a termination or notice provision in the pro-
vider agreement.87 Thus, this usually valuable "termination
upon notice" clause cannot be used. Attempting or threatening
to terminate may even subject a provider to penalties for a vio-
lation of the automatic stay. A provider therefore must gener-
ally continue to render services pursuant to the provider
contract until the debtor decides whether to assume or reject.88
The debtor generally has the period of time until the plan of
reorganization is approved to make a decision.89 This undeter-
mined time period, of potentially uncertain financial risk, should
be acknowledged by a provider when considering forming a re-
lationship with an HMO of unknown financial stability.
However, the nondebtor party may file a motion compelling
the debtor to either assume or reject the executory contract
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988).
86. GUIDE, supra note 75, § 30.04[2], at 30-15.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988).
88. GUIDE, supra note 75, § 30.04[2], at 30-17.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1988).
104 [Vol. 4
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within a certain period of time.90 Pursuant to this motion, the
nondebtor contracting party asks the court to set a deadline by
which the debtor must make a decision to either assume or re-
ject the contract. In this way, the nondebtor contracting party
can limit the period of time during which it operates in "limbo"
between the Chapter 11 filing and the debtor's formal assump-
tion or rejection of the contract.
However, a provider who continues services during this pe-
riod is not without a remedy. An administrative priority is
granted for the value of services provided during the postpeti-
tion period.91 These claims are superior to prepetition un-
secured claims. Although providers may have to wait for
payment, these claims must be paid in full upon confirmation of
a plan of reorganization. The only class with higher priority,
holders of secured claims, generally does not constitute a major
portion of an HMO's debt.92
As discussed, most HMO provider contracts are required to
include a hold-harmless clause, which prevents the contracting
provider from seeking payment from the member directly.93
These provisions transfer the financial risk from the payer to the
provider. The member of an insolvent HMO is thereby insu-
lated from having to reimburse the provider for services ren-
dered that the member believed to be covered by the HMO
contract. The hold-harmless clause protects the members of in-
solvent HMOs by preventing direct billing of enrollees. Con-
tract providers must acknowledge and assess this restriction in
order to be able to minimize losses caused thereby.
Noncontract providers face a different situation.94 Generally,
noncontract providers will not be required to continue services
to an insolvent HMO's members.95 No hold-harmless clauses
exist, and the provider may seek to bill the member directly for
services rendered.96 Noncontract providers may be able to sue
enrollees directly to recover payment for services rendered
prepetition. 97
90. Id.; FED. R. BANKR. P. 6006(b).
91. GUIDE, supra note 75, § 30.04[2], at 30-17.
92. Resnik, supra note 24, at 280, 281.
93. Id. at 281 n.71.
94. Id. at 282. In reality, few, if any, HMOs use noncontract providers.
95. Id. at 283-84.
96. Id.
97. Id.
1995]
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V. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS DANCE BETWEEN THE
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE AND STATE
INSOLVENCY LAWS
A. Claim Priorities
Generally, providers seeking payment for services will fare
better in bankruptcy proceedings where providers are treated as
equals with enrollees.98 However, under state regulation, enroll-
ees' claims are commonly given priority.99 Further, providers
generally have fewer rights under state insurance liquidation
proceedings, as the general goal of such a proceeding is to con-
tinue coverage for the enrollees with minimal monetary reliance
upon state insolvency funds.1°°
The Bankruptcy Code establishes the priority of claims in pro-
ceedings. 1 1 In a liquidation case under Chapter 7, after the pri-
ority claims are satisfied, unsecured claims are paid on a pro
rata basis. 10 2 Generally, unsecured claims will include those of
providers as well as enrollees. In a reorganization case under
98. Jon B. Christianson et al., State Responses to HMO Failures, HEALTH AF-
FAIRS, Winter 1991, at 78.
99. Id. at 82 n.8 (citing Patrick Cantilo, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Case for
State Regulation and Management of HMO Insolvencies, Address at Health Issues
1990: A Seminar for State Regulation (April 25-27, 1990)) (offering six reasons to
support state jurisdiction over insolvent HMOs).
100. See, e.g., GUIDE, supra note 75, § 30.05[5], at 30-37.
101. Joseph C. Branch & Kevin G. Fitzgerald, HMO Insolvency: Implications of
the Maxicare Decisions, 25 TORT & INS. LAW J. 766 (1990).
The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(1) First, administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this title,
and any fees and charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of
title 28;
(2) Second, unsecured claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title;
(3) Third, allowed unsecured claims... for wages, salaries, or commissions,
including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay... ;
(4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee ben-
efit plan... ;
(5) Fifth, allowed unsecured claims of persons [engaged in the production or
raising of grain or engaged as a United States fisherman] ... ;
(6) Sixth, allowed unsecured claims of individuals... arising from the de-
posit, before the commencement of the case, of money in connection with
the purchase, lease, or rental of property, or the purchase of services, for the
personal, family, or household use of such individuals, that were not deliv-
ered or provided;
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims for debts to a spouse, former spouse,
or child of the debtor... ;
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units ....
11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a) (1993 & West Supp. 1994).
102. Branch & Fitzgerald, supra note 101, at 777-78 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 726
(1988)).
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Chapter 11, payments are made pursuant to the plan of reorgan-
ization, which generally treats all unsecured claims equally.10 3
By contrast, policyholders in an insolvency proceeding of a
state following the Liquidation Model Act are generally given a
priority for their claims, which priority supersedes the claims of
providers.104 The Liquidation Model Act provides the top two
priorities for the costs of administration and employee claims
for services performed.0 5 While these two priorities are similar
to those described under the Bankruptcy Code, the third class of
claims under the Liquidation Model Act, known as "loss
claims," has no parallel in the Bankruptcy Code.0 6 Thus, prov-
iders seeking payment for services from a liquidated insurer may
be subordinated to policyholder claims. Providers will thus pre-
fer to have insolvent HMOs liquidated or reorganized under the
Bankruptcy Code pursuant to which their claims are not subject
to subordination.
B. The Issue: The Federal Bankruptcy Code, the HMO, and
the Procedural Exclusion
Like any debtor, an insolvent HMO may initially debate
whether to seek relief under Chapter 7 (liquidation) 10 7 or Chap-
ter 11 (reorganization) 10 8 of the Bankruptcy Code. However,
neither may be available as a debtor may seek protection "only
103. Id. at 778 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988)).
104. REHABILITATION AND LIQUIDATION MODEL ACr § 46 (Nat'l Ass'n of Insur-
ers Supervision, 1995), in 3 MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 555-47
(1995) [hereinafter LIQUIDATION MODEL AcT]).
105. Id. § 46(A)-(B).
106. Id. § 46(C).
Class 3 [loss claims include for distribution] [all claims under policies in-
cluding claims of the federal or any state or local government for losses in-
curred ("loss claims"), including third party claims, claims for unearned
premiums, and all claims of a guaranty association, for payment of covered
claims or covered obligations of the insurer.... All claims under life and
health insurance and annuity policies, whether for death proceeds, health
benefits, annuity proceeds, or investment values shall be treated as loss
claims. That portion of any loss, indemnification for which is provided by
other benefits or advantages recovered by the claimant, shall not be included
in this class, other than benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable in
discharge of familial obligation of support or by way of succession at death
or as proceeds of life insurance, or as gratuities. No payment by an em-
ployer to his employee shall be treated as a gratuity.
107. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
108. Id. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
19951
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if such person is not.., a domestic insurance company ....
The Code, however, provides no definition of "domestic insur-
ance company" for these purposes. 110 The dilemma presented
by the emergence of contemporary HMO structures is obvious:
courts have been left to determine whether these entities are
eligible for relief. If an HMO is deemed a "domestic insurance
company," it will be barred from seeking relief as a debtor
under the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts have generally applied three tests to determine
whether an HMO is a domestic insurance company for purposes
of the exclusion from bankruptcy protection. The tests include
the "state classification" test, the "independent classification"
test, and the "alternative relief" test.
A recent case involving the interpretation of the insurance
company exclusion is In re Estate of Medcare HMO."' Medcare
was a not-for-profit corporation licensed as an HMO in Illi-
nois,' and was the seventh largest HMO in Chicago, serving
54,000 enrollees. For a fixed monthly fee, Medcare provided en-
rollees with hospital care, physician services, skilled, extended,
and intermediate nursing care, home health care, pharmacy
services, medical appliances, and ambulance services. Medcare
also provided several preventative services." 3 Medcare con-
tracted with IPAs and directly provided care at four clinics.
1 4
In March of 1992, the Illinois Director of Insurance delivered
to Medcare a "Notice of Impairment," which required the HMO
to correct an impairment of its net worth in an amount in excess
of $5 million within 30 days. 1 5 When Medcare ultimately filed a
109. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1988). This exclusion from federal bankruptcy protec-
tion evidences a federal policy decision to defer to the states the regulation of insur-
ance companies, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 318-19 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6275-77, a policy that started nearly one hundred years
ago with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Harvey R. Miller & George
A. Davis, The Interplay of Insurance Companies and the Bankruptcy Code, in DIREC-
TORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 1993, at 247 (PLI Com. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 659, 1993). This policy was reinforced when Congress
enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1988) ("The business of insurance ... shall be subject to the laws of the
several states." 15 U.S.C. § 1012.).
110. This applies to both Chapters 7 and 11. Id. § 109(d) (1988).
111. 998 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. See 215 ILCS 125/1 to 125/6-19 (1994) (the Illinois Health Maintenance Or-
ganization Act).
113. Selcke v. Medcare HMO, 147 B.R. 895, 897-98 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd sub
nom. In re Estate of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1993).
114. Id. at 898.
115. Id.
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voluntary Chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy relief, the Director
moved to dismiss the petition, claiming that the HMO was an
excluded "domestic insurance company.""n 6
The bankruptcy court ruled that Medcare was not excluded
from filing under the Code. The court noted that an HMO is
permitted to be licensed under the HMO Act or the Illinois In-
surance Code.'1 7 It held that not all HMOs are insurance com-
panies; only those licensed under the Insurance Code that are
able to market indemnification insurance are considered insur-
ance companies. The court ruled that the HMO's function is the
delivery of care, and that any indemnification is only incidental
to this delivery." 8 Thus, Medcare was ruled by the bankruptcy
court not to be a "domestic insurance company. '' 19
The federal district court reversed on appeal. The court held
that because Illinois adopted the Model HMO Act provision
that requires HMO conservation, liquidation, or rehabilitation
to be conducted pursuant to insurance provisions, Illinois law
classifies HMOs for these purposes as insurance compa-
nies.120The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
116. Id. at 897. See also Resnik, supra note 24, at 275. Resnik notes that insur-
ance regulators' objections to Maxicare HMO affiliates' Chapter 11 petitions were
dismissed by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia in five cases. Id. at n.24. But see In re Portland Metro Health, Inc., 15 B.R. 102
(Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (insurance commissioner's motion to dismiss granted based on
determination that HMO was an insurance company).
117. 998 F.2d at 437 (providing an account of the bankruptcy court oral decision).
See generally 215 ILCS 125/1 to 125/6-19 (1994).
118. 998 F.2d at 438. The bankruptcy court determined that "the essential func-
tion of an HMO is the delivery of health care services and that, although this is ac-
complished through indemnification, the indemnification aspect is incidental to the
delivery of care." Id. See also CoucH, supra note 19, §§ 1:2, 1:3. The definition of
"insurance" is:
[a] contract by which one party, for a consideration, which is usually paid in
money either in one sum or at different times during the continuance of the
risk, promises to make a certain payment of money upon the destruction or
injury of something in which the other party has an interest... [i]n a general
sense, "insurance" is a contract to pay a sum of money upon the happening
of a particular event or contingency, or indemnity for loss in respect of a
specified subject by specified perils.
Id. § 1:2. In section 1:3, Couch explains that "[t]he primary requisite essential to a
contract of insurance is the assumption of risk of loss and the undertaking to indem-
nify the insured against such loss." Excepting contracts for life and accident insur-
ance, in which the consequence is death, insurance "is a contract of indemnity by
which is meant that the party insured is entitled to compensation for such loss as has
been occasioned by the perils insured against, the right to recover being commensu-
rate with the loss sustained . . . ." Id. § 1:9.
119. 998 F.2d at 438.
120. 147 B.R. 895, 897-98.
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trict court, holding that HMOs are insurance companies under
Illinois law. The court noted the three tests courts utilize to de-
termine whether an HMO is a domestic insurance company and
therefore an excluded entity under the Bankruptcy Code.121
The Medcare court found these multiple tests unworkable and
suggested an alternative. 22
1. The "State Classification" Test
Looking first to the statutory language of the domestic insur-
ance company exclusion, the Seventh Circuit noted that courts
have long deferred to laws of the organization's state of incorpo-
ration, in the absence of an explicit alternative, to determine
whether a given entity is one that is excluded from federal bank-
ruptcy protection. 23 This first test has been referred to as the
state classification test. 24 The test may be satisfied either by a
specific state law classification or by a determination that the
organization is the "substantial equivalent" of an organization in
the excluded group. 25
The Seventh Circuit implemented the "state classification"
test by first looking to the Illinois HMO Act, which specifies
that an HMO is classified as a "domestic company" for purposes
of the Insurance Code.126 The court placed great emphasis on
the fact that Illinois adopted legislation nearly identical to the
Model HMO Act provision classifying HMOs as insurance com-
panies for purposes of liquidation, conservation, or
rehabilitation. 127
121. 998 F.2d at 439.
122. Id. at 440. The court stated that
there should not really be three separate tests for ascertaining whether an
entity is excluded from the protection of the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, ab-
sent express classification under section 109 or some other federal statute,
the classification of an entity should generally follow the law of the state of
its incorporation, so long as that classification does not frustrate the pur-
poses of the Code.
Id. at 442.
123. Id. at 440 (citing Security Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Spurlock, 65 F.2d 768 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 678 (1933)).
124. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 109.02 (15th ed. 1994) (describing state
classification test).
125. 998 F.2d at 438. See also In re Cash Currency Exch., 37 B.R. 617 (N.D. Ill.
1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904 (1985) (discussion of
state classification test).
126. 998 F.2d at 442.
127. Id. at 442-43.
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Acknowledging that the existence of a state insolvency struc-
ture will not conclusively prove that the entity should be ex-
cluded pursuant to section 109(b)(2), 28 the court noted that
adopting the model provision is of significance to the state clas-
sification test in three respects. First, the law specifically classi-
fies HMO operation as a form of insurance for the purposes of
rehabilitation and liquidation. Second, the provision places the
insolvency process in the state law scheme created for insurance
companies and supervised by the Director of Insurance. Third,
the priority given to enrollee claims to maintain consumer secur-
ity is consistent with priorities given to other similar claims in
insolvency proceedings of other highly regulated entities ex-
cluded under section 109(b)(2). 129
To ensure that an exclusion resulting from the application of
the state classification test does not disturb the effectiveness of
the Bankruptcy Code, however, the Seventh Circuit also applied
a "substantial equivalency" test.130 In applying this additional
test, the court stated that the focus is on the "essential attribute"
of the organization.' 3 1 Factors for consideration include the de-
gree of state regulation over the organization, the presence of a
state law procedure for rehabilitation or liquidation, and the
public or quasi-public nature of the organization. 32
In Medcare, the court acknowledged that the extensive pow-
ers and functions granted to insurance companies pursuant to
Illinois law have no parallel within the Illinois HMO Act.133 The
court concluded that, based on definitions in the Illinois HMO
Act, the "arrangement or management of health care is a basic
attribute of an HMO .... ,,3 The focus of this test is determin-
ing whether an insurance company and an HMO share the qual-
128. But see In re Michigan Health Plan, 90 B.R. 274 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding
that HMO was not an insurance company at time of petition based on requested
attorney general's opinion of state classification).
129. 998 F.2d 436, 442-44.
130. Id. at 442, 444-45 (citing Cash Currency Exchange, 762 F.2d at 548).
131. Id. at 444-45.
132. Id. See In re Southern Indus. Banking Group, 59 B.R. 978 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(application of similar three factors to issue of bankruptcy exclusion application to an
industrial loan and thrift company); In re Cash Currency Exch., 37 B.R. 617 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (analysis of determinative factors); see generally COLLIER, supra note 124,
§ 109.16 ("[elven application of the 'state classification' test does not prevent a bank-
ruptcy court from looking into the substance of both the statute and the actual opera-
tions of the business under consideration").
133. 998 F.2d at 445. See In re Cash Currency Exch., 37 B.R. at 622-23 (currency
exchange not granted same powers as banks subject to Banking Act).
134. 998 F.2d at 445.
1995]
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ities leading to the exclusion of the former by section
109(b)(2). 135
The Seventh Circuit held that the "pivotal factor" leading to
the deference to state law is the "assumption of a third party's
risk for a premium.' 36 Finding that Medcare assumed this risk,
the court determined that it was the "substantial equivalent" of
an excluded "domestic insurance company."
Although the Medcare court holding suggests that the state
classification test is the sole test, as long as the classification
does not conflict with the Code, the Seventh Circuit noted that
courts have differed in their applications of this particular test.
Innumerable combinations of the three recognized tests appear
in reported cases.
2. The "Independent Classification" Test
The "independent classification" test requires courts to inter-
pret section 109 utilizing commonly accepted techniques of stat-
utory construction. 37 It is a generally recognized tenet of
statutory construction that when a provision enumerates exclu-
sions, entities not specifically excluded are encompassed by the
statute. 38 Exclusionary statutes such as section 109 are viewed
as exhaustive, not illustrative. 39 Thus, a court might simply as-
sess whether the HMO exercises powers and performs the func-
tions attributed to those entities generally fitting the definition
of an insurance company.140 However, because the test is essen-
tially based on a court's own construction of the Code, courts
have reached differing conclusions from applications of the in-
dependent classification test.
In In re Cash Currency Exchange, Inc.,, the court applied the
independent classification test to currency exchanges, holding
135. Id. at 444 (citing In re Beacon Health, Inc., 105 B.R. 178, 180 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1989)).
136. Id. See In re Portland Metro Health, Inc., 15 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. D. Or.
1981) ("The central insurance concept of the underwriting of, and the spreading of
risk is not changed by non-insurance or non-traditional features of the debtor's opera-
tion which involve provider agreements rather than cash dividends."); In re Beacon
Health, Inc., 105 B.R. at 186. But see In re Family Health Servs., Inc., 104 B.R. 268,
275 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (one of a number of "Maxicare" cases involving numer-
ous affiliates in a national HMO network).
137. See COLLIER, supra note 124, § 109-15.
138. Adam Hodkin, Note, Insurer Insolvency: Problems & Solutions, 20 HoFsTRA
L. REV. 727, 735 (1992).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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that since Congress chose to list excluded entities under section
109 and not provide illustrative examples, currency exchanges
are not excluded from bankruptcy relief.141 The bankruptcy
court also applied the independent classification test in In re
Beacon Health, Inc., to an HMO seeking Chapter 11 relief. 142
While inquiring whether Beacon Health had "attributes that are
substantially equivalent to those of an insurance company" for
section 109 purposes, 43 the court rejected the argument that an
HMO cannot be an insurance company because insurance in-
cludes indemnification and not the provision of health serv-
ices. 144 The court concluded that the HMO was a "domestic
insurance company" for purposes of section 109.145
In the case of In re Family Health Services, the bankruptcy
court applied the independent classification test and concluded
that since Congress was aware of the existence of HMOs at the
time of revisions to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress did not de-
sire a modification or expansion of the insurance company ex-
ception for HMOs. 46 The court concluded that the HMO was
eligible for bankruptcy relief since it was not expressly excluded
by section 109.147 In contrast, in Portland Metro Health, the
Bankruptcy Court of the District of Oregon relied upon an anal-
141. 37 B.R. 617 (N.D. I11. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 904 (1985).
142. 105 B.R. 178.
143. Id. at 180.
144. Id. at 186.
145. Id. at 187. The court stated:
The provision of services as opposed to direct indemnification is merely a
service in kind rather than cash. The HMO is simply an insurance company
covering its obligation to protect subscribers against medical care charges in
excess of the premium collected from them by providing the services directly
in kind, or indirectly through contract physicians, rather than after-the-fact
reimbursing in cash for charges paid directly by the subscriber elsewhere.
From the viewpoint of the subscriber/policy holder, there is no functional
difference between an HMO and an insurance company. It is immaterial to
the subscriber/policy holder whether the services are provided directly or the
cost of services provided elsewhere are reimbursed.
Id. at 186-87.
146. 101 B.R. 618, 621-22 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989). The "Maxicare" cases involved
numerous affiliates in a national HMO network. The bankruptcy court for the Cen-
tral District of California consolidated all of the Chapter 11 proceedings, holding that
none of the affiliates was excluded from Code protection by the insurance company
exclusion. Id. at 622. However, the decisions were "blunted" when a district court
reversed on appeal the bankruptcy court decision regarding the Wisconsin affiliate,
based on an application of the state classification test. See In re Estate of Medcare
HMO, 998 F.2d 436, 439 n.1 (citing In re Family Health Servs., Inc., 143 B.R. 232, 235
(C.D. Cal. 1992), rev'g 104 B.R. 279 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989)).
147. 101 B.R. at 622.
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ysis of shared qualities among the entities excluded from bank-
ruptcy relief to hold that an HMO was a domestic insurance
company. 148 In comparing the excluded entities' powers and du-
ties, the bankruptcy court noted that these entities are thor-
oughly regulated, subject to specific liquidation procedures
other than those set forth in the Bankruptcy Code, and are at
least quasi public in nature. 149
3. The "Alternative Relief" Test
A third test for determining whether entities are excluded by
section 109(b)(2), the "alternative relief" test, was also rejected
by the Medcare court. The alternative relief test assesses
whether, assuming the presence of a state liquidation procedure,
a bankruptcy proceeding is an agreeable alternative to the state
procedure. The alternative relief test is grounded in policy, of-
fering courts broad discretion in order to "serve the purpose and
intent of the Bankruptcy Code."' ' ° Under this test, "courts
should consider whether a bankruptcy proceeding is a satisfac-
tory method, compared with available State and Federal non-
bankruptcy methods, of reorganizing or liquidating a would-be
debtor.' 1 51 Courts should focus on the policies underlying the
federal bankruptcy laws, emphasizing "congressional intent and
factors of practicality and policy.' 52 Equitable treatment of all
unsecured creditors may be the determining factor. 3
Applying this test, courts have differed widely in their conclu-
sions. Several HMO cases have involved entities serving numer-
ous states; the argument made is that subjecting these entities
and their members to differing relief in each state is undesirable
and problematic. 15 In Medcare, the court summarily rejected
arguments that classifying HMOs as insurance companies con-
flicts with a federal need for a uniform interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code. The court noted that the United States
Supreme Court allows states to give priority to policyholders
different from that given under the federal priority statute, de-
148. 15 B.R. 102, 104 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981).
149. Id. (the court used this analysis while applying the state classification test).
150. Hodkin, supra note 138, at 736 n.50.
151. Id. at n.51.
152. In re Family Health Servs., Inc., 101 B.R. at 626 (citing In re Republic Trust &
Say. Co., 59 B.R. 606, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986)).
153. Id.
154. See In re Family Health Servs., Inc., 104 B.R. 268 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989)
(Chapter 11 petitions were filed by 47 affiliates of the national network of HMOs
across 15 states).
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spite the possible result of inconsistent state applications. The
Medcare court concluded that Congress was well aware of this
possible clash, yet intended deference to respect state law
structures.5 5
An argument under the alternative relief test that quicker dis-
position occurs through a single federal bankruptcy forum could
be validly raised in insolvency cases for HMOs such as those in
Kansas and Missouri, the two model states described above. In
those states, there is substantial overlap in service and enroll-
ment. Of the 37 HMOs reported to exist in Kansas and Mis-
souri, 12 serve residents in both states.156 Nevertheless, absent a
statutory amendment, allowing a single federal forum based on
the fact that the debtor is a multistate organization is not sup-
ported by constitutional or statutory authority and would con-
tradict congressional mandate. 157
CONCLUSION
As health care markets become increasingly competitive and
alternative delivery systems are forced to achieve increased effi-
ciencies, certain HMOs will be forced to exit the market. How-
ever, an HMO that petitions for federal bankruptcy protection
faces dismissal based on the Code's procedural exclusion for do-
mestic insurance companies.
Courts have erratically applied the "state classification," "in-
dependent classification," and "alternative relief" tests to deter-
mine whether an entity is excluded from bankruptcy protection
under section 109(b)(2). In Medcare, the court proposed that
the state classification test is controlling. In states in which the
statutory and regulatory classification is ambiguous, however,
this analysis will not yield consistent conclusions. Further, in
multistate insolvencies, it remains a practical truth that state law
classifications may result in inefficient and disparate treatment
of claims. Lastly, it is not clear that Congress intended to dele-
gate discretion to the states to control which entities will receive
federal bankruptcy protection. 158 As courts increasingly con-
155. In re Estate of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d at 447. But see In re Family Health
Servs., Inc., 101 B.R. at 636 (accepting argument that uniform federal reorganization
is desired over state proceedings based on practical and policy factors).
156. DIREcrORY, supra note 11, at 176-80, 220-28. Currently, two "group model"
HMOs serve counties in both Kansas and Missouri. Id. at 179, 224.
157. Branch & Fitzgerald, supra note 101, at 768.
158. Patrick Collins, HMO Eligibility for Bankruptcy: The Case for Federal Defini-
tions of 109(b)(2) Entities, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425,450 (1994). See generally
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front insolvencies of alternative delivery systems that eviscerate
traditional insurance and HMO concept distinctions, the state
classification test will likely prove inadequate.159
id. (offering complete discussion of case for federal definitions of section 109(b)(2)
entities).
159. See id. at 439-44 (presenting arguments surrounding state law classification
test and suggesting a need for federal interpretation of the terms included in section
109(b)(2)).
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